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Parental education is located at the center of global efforts to
improve child health. In a developing-country context, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) plays a crucial role in determining how
governments allocate scarce resources to education and public
health interventions. Under reforms mandated by IMF structural
adjustment programs, it may become harder for parents to reap
the benefits of their education due to wage contraction, welfare
retrenchment and generalized social insecurity. This study assesses
how the protective effect of education changes under IMF pro-
grams, and thus how parents’ ability to guard their children’s
health is affected by structural adjustment. We combine cross-
sectional stratified data (countries=67; children=1,941,734) from
theDemographic Health Surveys and theMultiple Indicator Cluster
Surveys. The sample represents approximately 2.8 billion (about
50%) of the world’s population in year 2000. Based on multilevel
models, our findings reveal that programs reduce the protective
effect of parental education on child health, especially in rural
areas. For instance, in the absence of IMF programs, living in
an household with educated parents reduces the odds of child
malnourishment by 38% (OR=0.62; 95% CI: 0.66 to 0.58); in the
presence of programs, this drops to 21% (OR=0.79; 95% CI: 0.86 to
0.74). In other words, the presence of IMF conditionality decreases
the protective effect of parents’ education on child malnourish-
ment by no less than 17%. We observe similar adverse effects
in sanitation, shelter, and health care access (including immuniza-
tion); but a beneficial effect in countering water deprivation.
International Monetary Fund j Education j Child health j Develop-
ment
Introduction
Parental education is a key determinant of child health. Across
developing countries, children born to mothers with no education
are three times more likely to die at a young age than those born
to mothers with secondary education (1). At the same time, the
allocation of scarce resources to essential social and public health
institutions in low- and middle-income countries frequently un-
folds under the policy parameters set by powerful international
financial institutions (2), like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
The IMF monitors the global economy and provides sup-
port to governments in economic turmoil, notably via its lending
programs. In exchange for low-cost financing, governments must
agree to implement a set of reforms, known as conditionalities.
The IMF relies on conditionalities to foster macroeconomic
stability through “correct[ing] maladjustments in [government]
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of
national or international prosperity” (3).
The success of IMF’s programs and the degree of collateral
damage they produce for public health is an ongoing controversy
(2, 4–6). Already in the 1980s, the years of recession and om-
nipresent IMF programs especially in African and Latin Amer-
ica, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) cautioned
against endangering vulnerable households and child health (7).
Following the recent global recession, further UNICEF reports
revealed that policy-makers remained focused on short-term eco-
nomic considerations, while rolling back critical education and
health interventions (8). The IMF responded to such critiques
by emphasizing its commitment to strengthening public health.
Its Poverty Reduction Strategy (9) has—purportedly—been tai-
lored to the needs of low-income countries (10). Yet, although
past research has studied the impact of IMF programs on child
health (11–13), no study—to our knowledge—have conducted a
systematic global analysis using micro-data.
This study assesses the connections between IMF programs
and parents’ ability to protect their children’s health. Educational
attainment is a reliable indicator of parents’ earning and socio-
economic class (14), and thus, households’ ability to withstand
economic change (15–18). As a tool to promote development,
governments provide free or low-cost education. Parents benefit
as their human capital increases, giving themmore capabilities to
nurture their children. Conditional cash transfer programs keep
children in schools and away from child labor, which increase
their cognitive capacities and improve their health (19). However,
access to and the value of education can be affected by economic
reform policies (20, 21). In the pursuit of macroeconomic sta-
bility, IMF programs include austerity measures that are associ-
ated with significant rollbacks of these social policies (22). For
instance, governments are forced to spend less on teachers and
contracting teachers’ wages. Tuition costs are passed on to the
households, reducing parents’ access to quality education. Their
human capital decreases, their employability, and earnings (7),
ultimately affecting the health of their children. Consequently,
we hypothesize a link between such IMF-mandated austerity
measures and the protective effect of parental education on child
health.
Data and Methods
Data
Significance
his study adds to the state of the art by analyzing the
impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on
children’s health, mediated by their parents’ education. It is
the first to combine macro andmicro-data to address this issue
systematically across five dimensions of child health: water,
malnutrition, shelter, sanitation, and health care access. The
sample represents about 2.8 billion (about 50%) of the world’s
population in year 2000. Usingmulti-level models, we find that
although IMF programs do not correlate directly with child
health indicators, they reduce the protective effect of parental
education on child health, especially in rural areas, and have a
mixed impact across the five dimensions of urban child health.
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Fig. 1. World Map of severe child health deprivation. Data sample and
average severe child health deprivation (in %). Authors’ calculations based
on the micro data. White colour indicating excluded country.
This study combines country, household, and child-level data,
Table S1 reports sources. The micro-data comes from the De-
mographic and Health Survey (DHS) and UNICEF’s Multiple
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Building on a two-stage cluster
sampling procedure, the aim of these nationally representative
surveys is to measure living conditions (23). In the first stage, the
DHS and MICS statisticians construct a sampling frame defining
the stratification of the population by key demographics, using the
latest census. This frame numbers country regions into primary
sampling units (clusters), which are then further sampled with a
probability proportional to their population size. In the second
stage, all households are listed in each cluster, of which about
20 to 30 are randomly selected for an on-location face-to-face
interview. The sample sizes normally vary between 4,000 to 30,000
households depending on population size, with a typical response
rate exceeding 90% (24). With these standardized procedures,
DHS and MICS surveys enable global analyses.
Our pooled sample represents about 2.8 billion (approxi-
mately 50%) of the world’s population by year 2000. Figure 1
captures this sample’s geographical distribution of child health
deprivation. Our dataset includes 67 low and middle-income
countries sampled once, with different timing, determined by the
DHS and MICS. The surveys were conducted around the year
2000 with a range of about ± 5 years, just before the substan-
tial global efforts put in place by various agencies to immunize
children: notably, before the Millennium Development Goals
was taking effect and just before the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation became involved. Table S2 outlines sample years and
sizes.
We measure child health across five dimensions: children’s
access to non-hazardous sanitation, improved water sources, and
vital health care (including immunization), safe housing, and if
they are sufficiently nourished. We derive these definitions from
Gordon et al.’s (25) pioneering study of child poverty in the
developing world. Table 1 outlines how these five dimensions are
operationalized. A core strength of these measures is that they in-
dicate actual access to resources, instead of consumption oppor-
tunities as is done in monetary approaches. The term deprivation
is understood as a latent continuum that ranges from no to
mild, moderate, severe and extreme deprivation (26). Severe and
extreme deprivations describe circumstances that exert highly
deleterious effects on children’s health, eventually resulting in
mortality (25). Table 1 outlies these five thresholds; when a child’s
health circumstances reaches over these cut-points, then that
child is deprived in that dimension (covering both extreme and
severe), with a resulting dichotomous outcome variable.
[Figure 1 about here], [Table 1 about here]
We use the head of household’s educational attainment from
the DHS and MICS as a measure of parental education. The
head is the person leading the household’s family affairs, and
is commonly the oldest man (27). We focus on the head of
household’s rather than the mother’s education, as the head, with
his or her elevated status in the family, is likely to affect both
the child’s and mother’s behavior (28). Educational attainment,
regardless of whether it is the head’s or the mother’s, correlates
highly with poverty; less educated respondents consistently have
lower socioeconomic status than their educated counterparts.
We include a household geographical indicator to capture urban
versus rural disparities. Our design controls for the number of
adults and children living in the household; the more adults
dwelling in the households, the more likely children are properly
cared for (29). The analysis also controls for the age and gender
of the child. Table S3 shows the frequency of children by their age,
head’s educational attainment, and household location.
Finally, we draw on country-level data. The presence or ab-
sence of IMF programs in a particular country and year is mea-
sured as a dummy variable (30). This measure indicates that the
government and the IMF have agreed to implement a program
to adjust the fiscal imbalances in the target country, in exchange
for a loan (2). The starting year defines when the program was
approved, if the agreement was signed in the first half of the
year; otherwise, the starting period is the following year. These
programs are tailored to each country, but will contain on average
40 conditions of which about 15 tend to be structural (31). Struc-
tural adjustment is the most intrusive types of condition, often
reducing social spending considerably, containing privatization or
liquidations of state-owned enterprises in various public sectors
(5): energy, agriculture, water and sewage systems, healthcare,
and education. Other types of conditions include tax increases
and trade liberalization. With the use of a dummy variable, we
assume that programs have similar effects on child health. Even
though an imperfect indicator, this approach follows conventions
in the field (2, 32), including work by the IMF itself (30). Unrav-
eling the heterogeneous effect of conditionalities is an important
future research task.
The analysis also included additional country-level variables,
defined in Table S1, that could confound the effect on child
health; Table S4 shows descriptive statistics while Table S5 outlies
correlations.
Statistical methods
The analysis has two core equations. First, we estimate a
Heckman selection model to predict a country’s likelihood to
participate in an IMF program, as program participation is not
random. Poorer countries, being more vulnerable to economic
turmoil, are more likely to solicit IMF support (2). Relying on
a version of the specification used by the IMF’s Independent
Evaluation Office (33), we use: IMF program participation in
the previous year, GDP growth, democracy, current account
balance, GDP per capita, the total number of countries on IMF
programmes, andUN voting affinity withG7 countries. The latter
two variables fulfil the exclusion restriction: a variable that is
significant in explaining the country’s participation decision in an
IMFprogram, but is not correlatedwith the dependent variable of
the outcome equation. After estimation, we calculate the inverse
Mills ratio to be included in the outcome equation to control
for the unobserved factors, potentially affecting selection into
programs (34). A complete outline of the motivation behind the
Heckman model is given in SI Text.
Second, we estimate the IMF effect on child health with
multi-level equations to account for the hierarchical nature of
our data (35): children are nested in households, households in
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Table 1. Individual level indicator – dependent variables – five dimensions of overall child health
Child Deprivation Cases Proportion
deprived
Water: Children who only have access to surface water (e.g., rivers) for drinking or who lived in households where
the nearest source of water was more than 15 minutes away. Children < 18 years old.
1,941,734 0.24
Malnutrition: Children whose heights and weights for their age were more than -3 standard deviations below the
median of the international reference, that is, severe anthropometric failure. Children < 5 years old.
815,264 0.07
Shelter: Children in dwellings with more than five people per room and/or with no flooring material. Children < 18
years old.
1,926,435 0.51
Sanitation: Children who had no access to a toilet of any kind in the vicinity of their dwelling, that is, no private or
communal toilets or latrines. Children < 18 years old.
1,940,599 0.28
Health (immunization &health-access): Children who has not been immunized against diseases or young children
who had a recent illness involving diarrhea and had not received any medical advice or treatment. [polio, measles,
DPT (against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus), tuberculosis (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin) recommended by the
WHO]. Children < 5 years old
944,895 0.13
Fig. 2. Marginal effect of IMF program on five dimensions of child health.
Above odds ratio 1 the effect is adverse; below 1 the effect is beneficial (the
lower odds ratio, the less likely the child is deprived). The models cannot
detect any significant effect. Error bars are 95% CIs.
neighborhoods, neighborhoods in broader geographical regions,
and lastly, all these levels are nested in countries. Because of some
sparse observations within households and by neighbourhood, the
estimation does not converge when we include these levels. We
settled on a parsimonious two-level model: children nested in
countries. This model is likely to give some upward biased stan-
dard errors for the household variables, but does not otherwise
affect the estimates.
Our base model is a random intercept logit model with child i
nested in country k. The random term captures each country’s
deviation from the conditional mean (the intercept); it is assumed
to be normally distributed with variance . The outcome variable
measures whether a child is severely health deprived
or not, in five dimensions (the index d). The key explanatory vari-
able , indicates whether an IMF agreement was in place
in the preceding year. controls for selection bias, as
described above: a positive effect implies that unobserved factors,
which make IMF program participation more likely, increase the
probability of severe deprivation. A number of country controls
as well as household and child controls are included :
log GDP per capita, received foreign aid, health spending, civil
war, population dependency ratio (share of the population aged
under 15 and over 65), democracy, year of interview. All country
level covariates are lagged two years. The superscript indicates
the level of analysis (a designates the child level, and b the country
level).
Time is present in two ways in our research design: first, in
terms of the sampling date of when the DHS and MICS surveyed
children’s living conditions (which varies between countries); and
second, as lags of the country-level covariates (as described above,
we use an identical lag structure across countries). Each child
(and country) is only sampled once, thus rendering the design of
our study cross-sectional. IMF programs’ effect on children will
likely take some time to materialize and to fade out; using the
presence of a program in the previous year has been proposed as
an appropriate way of capturing this lagged impact (12, 13). We
lag the pre-treatment conditions by two years and thus avoid post-
treatment controls, which will give us the total treatment effect
(36). In short, limited data availability imposed by sampling dates
restricts our analysis to a cross-sectional design, and country lags,
facilitated by available observations of covariates, are central to
our methodological approach.
Although our design does not use quasi-experimental design
methods, such as difference-in-differences which would require
pre- and post-programmeasurements of child health, it neverthe-
less captures differences in child health by parental educational
attainment between countries under treatment and countries
serving as controls. We do this by including a set of interaction
terms to our base model to capture these moderation effects (37).
We stratify the analysis further by evaluating this effect by house-
hold location, as the literature has found large heterogeneity
when looking at disparities between urban and rural households
in low- and middle-income countries (29).
The lack of pre- and post-treatment measurement of child
health implies that we cannot study shifts in deprivation preva-
lence and trajectories of child health as a function of IMF pro-
grams. Ideally, a panel study of children followed over time,
before and after the presence of an IMF program, and in coun-
tries with and without a program, would enable a full-fledged
causal analysis. While we do not claim causality, our approach
nonetheless sheds important light on the complex associations
between IMF programs, parental education, and child health.
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Fig. 3. The protective effect of education in the urban versus rural population. The panel shows the effect of the head of household’s education on their
children’s health outcomes (educated versus non-educated), moderated by country participation in IMF programs. The figure captures the partial marginal
effect on the odds ratio scale with 95% CIs. Above odds ratio 1 the effect is adverse; below 1 the effect is beneficial. When a country participates in a program,
the beneficial effect of parental education against malnutrition and health deprivation tends to weaken in both the urban and rural population; the beneficial
effect of parental education increases in shelter and sanitation deprivations in urban population.
Results
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 visualizes the estimated impact of IMF programs
on the five dimensions of child health—the complete regressions
results are presented in Table S6. Although most coefficients
indicate an adverse effect, they are not statistically significant.
The confidence intervals are large, as this is a country-level
measure with weaker statistical power compared to the child-
level measures. As expected, as the head of household’s level of
education increases, the odds of severe child health deprivation
decrease. For instance, living in a household where at least one
of the parents has primary education corresponds to a 16% drop
in the odds of severe malnourishment compared to one with
no parental education; the difference is even starker, at 42%,
for parents with secondary education. This beneficial effect of
parental education is consistent and significant across all five child
health dimensions.
Our models reveal a highly-pronounced gap between rural
and urban populations: a shift from urban to rural areas increases
the odds of water and sanitation deprivation prevalence by a fac-
tor of five. For malnourishment and health deprivation, the same
shift is associated with a 50% increase.While these disparities are
well-known in the development literature (29, 38), less is known
about how they change in the presence of IMF programs.
In the next step, we estimate the moderation effect of IMF
programs on education and household location. Figure 3 visual-
izes how the marginal effects of education change according to
the presence or absence of programs, stratified by rural versus ur-
ban context; Table S8 shows these exact interactive effects. Table
S7 reports the full estimated model, which include a three-way
interaction between programs, head of household’s education,
and household’s location (urban vs. rural). We reduced the three
education categories (no education, primary, and secondary+) to
two (no education versus education), facilitating interpretation.
We report the unreducedmodels in Table S15. Except for location
interacted with education for health deprivation, all interaction
terms are statistically significant.
[Figure 3 about here]
For rural populations, the protective effect of parental edu-
cation decreases significantly when countries participate in IMF
programs. Children face higher odds of suffering from depri-
vation in four out of the five dimensions. In the absence of a
program, children living in an educated household have a re-
duced odds of being malnourished by 38% (OR= 0.62; 95%-CI:
0.66 to 0.58), compared to children of uneducated households;
under adjustment, this beneficial effect drops to 21% (OR=
0.79; 95%-CI: 0.86 to 0.74). In other words, the presence of IMF
conditionality erodes the protective effect of education against
child malnourishment by no less than 17% in rural contexts. This
effect is comparable across the other deprivations. In shelter
deprivation, the presence of IMF yields an erosion of 15%; in
sanitation, the decrease is 18%; and in health (healthcare in-
cluding immunization) the loss is 24%. Water deprivation is an
exception: living in an educated household improves children’s
odds of avoiding water deprivation by 39% (OR= 0.61; 95%-CI:
0.63 to 0.59) to 45% (OR= 0.55; 95%-CI: 0.57 to 0.53).
In contrast, children in urban areas see no change in the odds
of water deprivation, but they experience a beneficial change in
the odds of being shelter and sanitation deprived. The shift from
no to some parental education corresponds to a change from a
50% (OR = 0.5; 95%-CI: 0.50 to 0.49) to 57% (OR = 0.43; 95%
CI: 0.44 to 0.42) decrease in the odds of suffering from shelter
deprivation; an improvement of 7%. In sanitation deprivation, the
improvement is also 7%. Conversely, urban children experience
a deterioration in the odds of being malnourished and health
deprived (healthcare including immunization): 9% and 6%, re-
spectively.
SI Text discusses and Table S10 to Table S14 presents our
tests of the robustness of the selection equation, with alternative
specifications; Figure S1 and Figure S2 show how these specifi-
cation affect the outcome model. Overall, these tests show that
the results produced in the outcome stage, hold even with a less
robust selection equation (less predictive probit model). SI Text
presents further sensitivity analysis, focusing on the specification
of the multilevel models (outcome stage)—keeping the selection
equation constant. First, in the interaction analysis above, we
reduced the education three-level categories to a binary one
(educated vs. non-educated) for clarity of presentation purposes.
We present the result for the three-level interaction in Table
S15, Figure S3 and Figure S4. Although there are some nuances
in the moderation effect, the inference we draw are consistent.
Second, instead of one year lagged effect, we estimated the main
effect of IMF programs using three versions of historical burden:
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sum of programs (Table S16 and Figure S5), count of struc-
tural conditions (Table S17 and Figure S6), count of quantitative
conditions (Table S18 and Figure S7). The results confirm the
absence of significant direct relationships with all five dimensions
of child health. SI Text also outlines checks of keymultilevelmodel
assumptions, normality of residuals (Figure S8 to Figure S12) and
homoscedasticity (Figure S13 to Figure S17). These test show a
fair conformity to these assumptions. The inferences drawn from
this study hold even by controlling for potential outliers (e.g.
Sudan andMalawi). Fourthly, sample (DHS andMICS) weighted
estimations are presented in Table S9, showing high consistency
with the unweighted estimations used in the main results. Lastly,
we face no serious multicollinearity between our key country
variables, as shown by the correlation matrix in Table S5.
Discussion
This study has shown that IMF programs erode the protective
effect of parental education on child health, especially in rural
areas. We also find some mixed results in urban areas. Children
of educated parents still have better health than their peers with
uneducated parents. However, this gap shrinks under programs.
We offer some potential explanations of these observations by
highlighting the broader relationship between IMF programs and
the societal effects of austerity (5, 7, 13, 32, 38–40). Our study
raises four main questions.
First, and most importantly, why does the protective effect
of parental education erode under IMF programs? Our results
indicate that austerity undermines the benefits and value of
educational capital. We propose a series of interlinked ways in
which this can happen. A first (direct) mechanism involves the
impacts of reduced fiscal space under austerity, which under-
mines a government's capacity to provide tuition-free or low-
cost quality education. On the one hand, fewer parents will gain
access to education. On the other, even those who may get an
education, will be affected by IMF-mandated government wage
bill ceilings, which can limit the numbers of teachers in public
schools, leading to staff shortages, reduced teaching quality, and
further devaluation of education (21, 41). This depreciation of
educational resources is then likely to reduce the beneficial effect
of parental education on child health, weakening the capabilities
of households and communities (20).
Another (indirect) mechanism is closely intertwined with
the first: under austerity, governments spend less not only on
education but also on the protection of labour. Reductions in
public spending on social policies, mandated by the IMF, can yield
social insecurity and wage repression, resulting in a downward
mobility for the middle classes. In the context of rapidly changing
socioeconomic environments during periods of structural adjust-
ment programs, degrading employment prospects wrought by
economic deregulation curb the otherwise important marginal
utility of basic educational resources in the making of parents'
ability to protect their children (4, 13, 42). As a result, the gap
between parents who have an education and those who lack gets
reduced.
Over and above these mechanism, parents lacking an educa-
tion in the first place—who tend also to be the poorest segment
of the population—are already economically excluded from the
labour market, and therefore, these changes seems to effect them
less.
Second, why is the protective effect of education weaker
in rural compared to urban areas, under IMF programs? It is
plausible that under economic turmoil, governments will channel
scarce resources towards cities rather than villages, as these are
major sites for corporate profit, and thus, can generate further
tax revenue (4). This, in turn, implies that educated rural families
have a harder time mobilizing resources for the benefits of their
children.
Third, why do the benefits of education increase in rural areas
in relation to water deprivation? Among its manifold privatiza-
tion conditionalities, water privatization has been imposed by the
IMF in developing countries (43). Against the backdrop of previ-
ous research, our findings suggest that the more educated—who
tend to also have higher socio-economic status—stand out as the
principal beneficiaries of this measure. As people will have to pay
the full cost for water access, the poor will tend to choose less
costly, albeit less safe, water sources (4). The availability of water
is more widespread in the urban areas, which can explain why no
significant change is observed in our models.
Fourth, why do the benefits of education decrease in relation
to malnutrition and health care access, not only in rural but
also in urban areas? A potential mechanism lies in the IMF’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy, which might be equalizing the risk
exposure across different educational, socioeconomic and spa-
tial landscapes (44). However, the Poverty Reduction Strategy
commenced post-1999, meaning only some of the surveys in our
sample would pick up this potential effect. Another possible
explanation pertains to the seeming inefficiency of health systems,
as evidenced by the insignificant effect of health spending in our
models. The absence of any effect is consistent across different
measures for health spending; of eight different it is only signif-
icant in one case (see Table S19 and Table S20). Realistically,
increased health spending should have some beneficial effect on
children’s health. However, under IMF programs, government
subsidies for immunization, healthcare, and food are often the
first to be dismantled (13, 45). This may indicate that health-
related resources are inefficiently allocated by governments im-
plementing adjustment programs. Further research can probe the
concretemechanisms throughwhich conditionalities affect health
system efficiency.
Before evaluating the policy relevance of this study, it is
important to note its main limitations. First, this study focuses
on program participation as an aggregate package of conditions.
Disentangling the effect of the various types of conditions on child
health is an important task for future research (31). Second, the
research design permits mainly a discussion of correlation but not
causation. For lack of a proper time-dimension for the outcome
variable, our study cannot establish the nature and direction of
causality. Although we used a lagged treatment variable for IMF
programs and the country level covariates, we cannot control for
endogenous child health trends (initial values before program
implementation). Third, we used Gordon et al. and UNICEF’s
definitions (thresholds) for severe child health deprivations (25).
Evaluating how the results change across different thresholds is
an important task for future studies. Fourth, we focused on the
head of household’s educational attainment, who tends to be
the husband or the oldest male of the family (27). While this is
an encompassing proxy of the household’s socioeconomic status
(28), there might be further differential effects in relation to the
gender of the child and paternal structures. Our results show,
for example, that, except for access to health services including
vaccination where we find no significant difference between boys
and girls, for the other outcomes boys tend to have higher odds
of being deprived. The difference is small for water, shelter and
sanitation (1% higher odds), and larger in nutritional deprivation
(6%). This differential might be explicated by further disentan-
gling family gender compositions.
Although we used data sampled over a decade ago, there are
substantive reasons to believe that the effects of IMF programs
are still comparable today. Even though the IMF has sought to
change its public image and purports to have transformed its
lending practices (9), its programs still aim towards the same
goals: to balance government spending via steep reductions in
social spending, privatization of public services, and declines in
the provision of public goods as educational resources (8, 31).
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In sum, our study suggests that IMF programs are working
at cross-purposes vis-à-vis child health. IMF interventions seek
to foster economic stability, which yields beneficial effects for
the population. However, at the same time, these IMF-mandated
adjustment measures diminish the protective effect of parental
education on child health. Government officials need to ensure
that policy recommendations or demands made by the IMF do
not entail inadvertent deleterious effects, whether directly or via
erosion of parental resources. One way of achieving this is to
expand the recently launched co-cooperation between the IMF,
the World Bank and UNICEF (46, 47), geared towards closer
monitoring of the socio-spatially multidirectional impacts of ad-
justment on children. This effort would give policy-makers the
opportunity to identify both beneficial and adverse effects over
time, and thus to orient adjustment policies towards fostering
economic stability without endangering population health.
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